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The Ph.D. thesis offers a complex reconceptualization of the constitutional 
system in the European Union. The constitutional systems of the Member States have 
been substantially transformed during the 20th century. Meanwhile a new 
constitutional system functioning in the Member States alongside their own systems 
has emerged – the constitutional system of the European Union. These two 
fundamental changes are difficult to grasp through an existing theoretical framework. 
That is because the framework is based on a set of outdated concepts: (i) Rousseau’s 
concept of volonté générale that forms the basis of the parliamentary supremacy in a 
constitutional system; (ii) Montesquieu’s theory of three separate powers (legislative, 
executive, and judicial) that is on the one hand unable to deal with new phenomena 
such as bureaucracy and independent agencies, and on the other hand to grasp a 
possibility of checks and balances within the individual powers; (iii) Westphalian 
national state paradigm characterized by sovereignty, which does not tolerate plurality 
of authorities both within the system and in external relations; (iv) hierarchically built 
legal order, which prevents coexistence of autonomous norms; (v) legalistic view of 
law, where law is to be found only in written, officially promulgated sources of law, 
which were adopted by a legislator (law in books); and (vi) understanding the role of 
courts as independent institutions of conflict solving (and occasionally endowed with 
	   2 
other tasks) that merely applies the law as contained in the books using established 
methods of interpretation to reach the only right decision.  
To be sure, such theoretical framework has been subjected to fragmentary 
changes. However, such changes face the limits posed by other parts of the theoretical 
framework, which is rather holistic with all parts being interconnected and mutually 
supportive. For this reason, the theoretical framework has to be refuted at once and a 
new framework that would reflect the transformation of the constitutional systems in 
Europe needs to be built up, so that further development of the European 
constitutional system is possible. 
The thesis has two parts. The first part deals with the decline of the French 
constitutional model caused by increased influence of courts after the constitutional 
judiciary was established and endowed with concrete constitutionality review 
alongside with the rapid development of human rights after the Second World War. 
This process is known as judicialization of constitutional systems. It denotes a 
process, in which parliamentary supremacy and judicial subordination (explicated in 
the concept of juge-automate) has been replaced by structural supremacy of the 
highest judicial institutions.  
Subsequently, we focus on the specific case of the European Union. Its 
constitutional system was not designed as one of the parliamentary supremacy and so 
the judicialization occurred in a different way. An analysis of the discourse on the role 
of the Court of Justice in the European integration revealed that at the onset of 1990s 
there were two models of the Court’s role in the integration process – the Moravcsik-
Garrett’s liberal intergovernmental model denying autonomous role to the Court of 
Justice in the integration process, and the Stein-Stone-Sweet’s neofunctional model 
claiming structural supremacy of the Court of Justice both within the European Union 
constitutional system and in the relationship between the Union and its Member 
States (that is in the wider area called European constitutional space). During the last 
twenty years the European constitutional system has profoundly changed and neither 
of the two models were anymore viable. The constitutional courts of the Member 
States have formed a powerful counterweight to the Court of Justice. Therefore we 
must consider a third, synthetic model that stems from the theory of constitutional 
pluralism. Fundamental principles of the European constitutional system are 
formulated in a discourse among highest interpreters of the Union and Member States 
	   3 
constitutions; that is in a discourse held among the Court of Justice and Member 
States constitutional courts.  
Based on these observations, we formulate a model that explains the 
interactions of constitutional practices of the highest judicial institutions of the Union 
and the Member States in the European constitutional space. Through this interaction 
a set of fundamental norms regulating the relationship among the constitutional 
organs as well as between these organs and individuals has been established. The 
model is theoretically grounded in current positivist theories of law developing further 
Hart’s views on law, which explain how this constitutional practices gain normativity. 
We may call the set of fundamental norms thus created a common European 
constitution.  
The constitutional-pluralist model is compared to the constitutional system of 
the United States. We observe a similar process of judicialization. The U.S. 
Constitution originally intended the Congress to be supreme. This supremacy was 
gradually erased. First, the U.S. Supreme Court under the long tenure of John 
Marshall established itself as an equal power and later the rise of the Presidency 
followed. All three institutions claimed to be the supreme interpreter of the U.S. 
Constitution. A system of institutional or interpretative pluralism thus emerged. Such 
system is similar in the way it operates to the system of constitutional pluralism 
established in the European Union. A comparison with the constitutional system in 
the United States with an emphasis on the role of the U.S. Supreme Court is 
repeatedly used throughout the thesis in order to identify unique features of the 
European case. For instance so called doctrines of interposition, which were 
developed by the Czech Constitutional Court or the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
among others, can be found in a very similar wording in the antebellum United States, 
despite the fact that the U.S. Constitution contains a provision that the federal 
Constitution and federal laws are the law of the land.  
The second part of the thesis analyzes processes that affect courts’ interaction 
after the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. It inquires into changes at both 
sides of such interaction – the Court of Justice and its adaptation on the enlargement 
of the Union externally as well as internally, and the Member States’ constitutional 
courts, where especially an influence of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 
whose case law laid the bases of the constitutional-pluralist model, is of our interest, 
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as well as the case law of the Czech Constitutional Court that represents current 
challenges to the further development of this model.  
A role of courts in the formulation of fundamental principles of the common 
constitution is also analyzed from the viewpoint of democratic legitimacy. Given the 
paradoxical combination of judicialization of constitutional systems on the one hand 
and outdated perception of courts by general public in line with the so-called juge-
automate thesis on the other hand, courts pertain high legitimacy; that is particularly 
true for constitutional courts. Legitimacy of the European Union is often an object of 
analysis of the Member States constitutional courts in their case law on the 
relationship between the EU law and their national legal order. Courts deal with 
legitimacy in three ways – they participate in a debate on legitimacy and its sources, 
direct the debate and shape its contents, and finally they are themselves able to 
generate legitimacy for the European integration project. That is true especially for 
the new Member States constitutional courts, whose legitimizing role is heightened 
due to their special position within the constitutional system that they achieved during 
a period of reconstitutionalization that followed after the fall of the undemocratic 
regimes. Although the “European” doctrines of these courts are criticized in this thesis 
for they are grounded in the outdated theoretical framework described above, they 
reflect an opinion of the general public in the new Member States. The ability of 
constitutional courts to aggregate via their “European” doctrines these opinions, to 
communicate them to other constitutional actors in the European constitutional space, 
and eventually to put them partially through, increases the legitimacy of the European 
integration and therefore also the legitimacy of the European Union itself. 
The last two chapters focus on the case law of the Czech Constitutional Court, 
which, as a consequence of the outdated theoretical framework described above, 
shows certain misunderstanding of the nature of Union law. The Constitutional Court 
must realize that in the Czech republic two legal orders operate, an that these orders 
are, despite their autonomous grounds, deeply interconnected and creates a dense 
network of mutual relations. Though the Constitutional Court lacks the jurisdiction 
towards Union law, which is reserved to the Court of Justice, it cannot abandon one of 
its two fundamental tasks – to ensure smooth functioning of the constitutional system 
(besides providing justice by resolving individual cases). While the latter task can be 
left, within the sphere of Union law, to the Court of Justice (as the standard of 
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fundamental rights protection in the European Union is comparable to the standard 
ensured in the Czech Republic), the former task requires the Czech Constitutional 
Court from time to time to review and adjust the relationship between the two legal 
orders. The Constitutional Court thus operates “between two legal orders”. As the 
Court of Justice must from time to time adjust the relationship between the Union 
legal order and the Member States’ legal orders, also the Czech Constitutional Court 
must step in the relationship between the Czech constitutional order and the Union 
law when a serious (structural) conflict emerges. In order to weight the seriousness of 
the conflict and find an adequate solution that allows both the Czech Constitutional 
Court and the Court of Justice to continue fulfilling their tasks, a new doctrine is 
offered for the Czech Constitutional Court to replace its current one. Call it a relativist 
doctrine. It contains several filter mechanisms that provide for sufficiently 
differentiating approach towards conflict resolution between the Union law and the 
Czech constitutional order. With such an approach the conflict with the Court of 
Justice can be avoided, while the Czech constitutional provisions receive its effet 
utile. 
